Protest movements
When a group that its government has made poorer takes to the streets, how its anger rises, and what the government can do in response. This page covers equation E33.
In plain words
Every month, each group of the population measures what its income has lost since the government took office (E27). A loss due to a decision of the state counts in full, whereas a loss due to the economic cycle counts a quarter as much. Beyond a loss of 2%, each additional point calls for 10 points of anger, on a scale of 0 to 100, and the group takes to the streets as soon as the anger called for reaches 5 points. Its anger then rises towards this level and covers half the way in 20 days. The group nonetheless gets used to a loss that lasts, and after six months it feels only half of it, so a movement that nobody responds to ends up dying down by itself. Beyond 60 points, the protests turn into riots, the first of which costs 0.2% of the year's output. The movement dies out when the anger and what calls for it are both below 5 points. Each group has a demand on one budget line, and the government can concede, receive the movement, use a firm hand or let it run its course.
In the game
A measure the player takes does not apply on the day they take it, since it waits for the 1st of the following month or for the vote of parliament. In between, it is announced, and the groups judge it every day as if it already applied, so people take to the streets on the very day a cut is announced. The player answers each movement in their country whenever they want, group by group. The news reports every turning point of a movement in the player's country, whereas abroad it reports only the start, the first riot, the firm hand that answers it and the end. Non-player governments use a firm hand at every riot and never concede. A game setting switches protest movements off.
The basics
Historical studies find that social unrest increases with the size of budget cuts, and one of them shows this country by country, for Europe from 1919 to 2008. The game takes up this idea. A group in the game protests when its government has made it lose a share of its income, and its anger grows with this loss.
People do not judge a loss decided by the state and a loss due to the economic cycle in the same way. A study of the Swedish tax register finds that a change in income due to a decision of the state weighs four times more on the vote than a change due to the market, and the game applies the same ratio to anger.
Each group has its demand, a budget line that it wants to see raised or lowered. If the government has moved this line against the group, or announced that it would, the group demands a return to the previous level. Otherwise, it asks for half a point of GDP more in its direction.
| Group | What it demands |
|---|---|
| retirees | higher pensions |
| low-income households, the unemployed | higher other social benefits |
| the middle class | less income tax |
| well-off households | lower property taxes |
| young people | more education |
| rural dwellers | lower excise duties, above all on fuel |
E33. Protest movements
In plain words
The loss of a group equals what the state has taken from its income, plus a quarter of what the market has taken from it. The first two points of loss are tolerated, but each point beyond them calls for 10 points of anger, up to 100. Each day, anger closes 3.4% of the gap between it and this level, which makes it cover half the way in 20 days. At the same time, the group gets used to the loss it lives with. Each day, what it has got used to closes a small part of the gap to the loss in force, half of it in six months, and only the loss it still feels calls for anger. A measure that is only announced is not forgotten in this way, since nobody bears it yet, and a gain is not a loss to get used to. Only the first riot of a movement costs output. The studio does not charge for the later ones, because studies measure what an episode of unrest costs, not each night of clashes.
The government's responses remove anger at a stroke, half of it when the government concedes, 15 points when it receives the movement and 40 points when it uses a firm hand. Conceding also removes the measure that was calling for the anger, so the anger then falls back on its own, whereas after the firm hand the loss remains and the anger rises again, as long as the group has not got used to it enough. Letting the movement run its course changes nothing at the time, but the movement dies down as the group gets used to its loss.
The French government cuts pensions by two points of GDP. The state thereby takes 18.5% of their income from retirees, while the economic cycle gives them back 0.9%, so that their loss is 18.5 − 0.9 / 4 = 18.3%. It calls for 10 × (18.3 − 2) = 163 points of anger, brought back to 100. Starting from zero, the retirees' anger passes 60 points after 27 days, and their protests then turn into riots. If nobody responds to them, they gradually get used to their loss, and after six months they feel only half of it, 9.1%, which still calls for 71 points of anger.
In the formula:
| Symbol | What it is | In the example |
|---|---|---|
| \(L_g\) | the loss of group \(g\), as a % of its income | 18.3 |
| \(p_g\), \(m_g\) | what the state, and what the market, have changed in its income since the government took office | −18.5; +0.9 |
| \(b_M / b_P\) | the weight of a loss due to the market, compared with a loss due to the state (E28) | 0.05 / 0.2 = 0.25 |
| \(\bar L\) | the loss from which a group protests | 2% |
| \(\kappa\) | the points of anger per point of loss beyond it | 10 |
| \(A^{*}_g\), \(A_t\) | the anger that the loss calls for, and the day's anger | 100 |
| \(s_A\), \(h_A\) | the share of the gap closed each day, and its half-life | 3.4%; 20 days |
| \(H_g\), \(\tilde L_g\) | how much of its loss the group has got used to, and the loss it still feels | 9.1 and 9.1 after six months |
| \(s_H\), \(h_H\) | the share of the gap that habituation closes each day, and its half-life | 0.38%; 180 days |
Show the full formula and its sourcesThe grievance, the anger, the start, the demand, the cost of riots, every parameter with its source.
The grievance. On the first of each month, the groups read their incomes (E27). The change in the income of a person in group g since the government took office splits in two. One part is what the state's decisions have changed in it, pg, that is, the person's income today against the income they would have with the budget lines the government found. The other part is what the market has changed in it, mg, that is, output and unemployment, with the lines of that time. The loss the group feels, in %, weighs the two as the group weighs them in its vote (E28):
with bP = own_income_policy and bM = own_income_market. A loss due to a decision of the state counts four times as much as a loss due to the economic situation.
Habituation. A group gets used to the loss it lives with. Each day, what it has got used to, Hg, closes part of its gap with the loss in force (the one read on the first of the month, not a measure that has only been announced, which nobody bears yet), and what it still feels is the remainder:
with the half-life hH = unrest_habituation_half_life_days. A loss that persists is felt half as much every hH days. A gain is not a loss to get used to. H does not go below zero, and losing that gain later is felt in full. Once the loss is given back, H falls back at the same pace. A new government starts again from H = 0, as it starts again from a zero loss (E28).
Anger. The anger that the felt loss calls for, from 0 to 100:
where L̄ = unrest_grievance is the loss from which a group protests, and κ = unrest_anger_per_point the points of anger per point of loss beyond it.
The start. On the same day, each group that is not already in the streets, and whose last movement ended at least unrest_cooldown_days days ago, takes to the streets if the anger its loss calls for reaches at least the end threshold (unrest_end_anger). A movement that would end on the same day is not a movement. Its anger starts from zero. Several groups can be in the streets at once, each in its own movement, with its anger, its demand and the responses it has received. A group leads only one at a time. Groups that start on the same day are ordered as in the data. The anger called for by a movement under way is read again each month, and each day in the player's country (see the announced measures).
Each day, anger A closes part of its gap with what the loss calls for:
with the half-life hA = unrest_anger_half_life_days. Beyond unrest_riot_anger, the protests turn into riots. Once anger is back below it, the riots calm down into protests. When anger and what the loss calls for are both below unrest_end_anger, the movement dies out. A movement that nobody responds to therefore subsides on its own. The riots calm down, then the movement dies out, as the group gets used to its loss, with the measure that started it still in force.
The demand. Each group asks for a budget line, raised or cut. Retirees ask for their pensions, low-income households and the unemployed for the other benefits, the middle class for less income tax, well-off households for lower property taxes, young people for education, and rural dwellers for lower excise duties (fuel). A group asks for the line where the government found it, if the government has moved it, or announced a move, against the group. Otherwise it asks for unrest_demand_step points of GDP more in its direction, starting from the announced value if there is one. The demand is fixed when the movement starts, within the bounds of the lever.
Riots cost output the first time a movement turns to them. They act on the same day like a world event that would change output in the first year by unrest_riot_output (E18), that is, a jump in the output gap that fades at its own speed. Relapses of the same movement cost nothing more. Studies measure the episode, not each night of clashes. Two groups that turn to rioting each cost their share.
| Variable | Meaning | Unit | Bounds |
|---|---|---|---|
| pg, mg | what the state, and what the market, have changed in the income of a person in the group since the government took office | % | not controlled |
| Lg | the loss the group reads | % | not controlled |
habituated Hg | how much of its loss each group of each country has got used to | % | 0 and above |
| L̃g | the loss it still feels | % | not controlled |
movements | each country's movements under way, in the order they started: the group, its start, whether it is rioting, its anger and the anger its loss calls for, its demand, the responses already given | — | at most one per group |
| A, A* | the movement's anger, and the anger its loss calls for | points | 0 to 100 |
calm_until | for each group of each country, the first day it can take to the streets again | day | — |
| Parameter | Value | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
unrest_grievance L̄ | 2% of income | Ponticelli and Voth (2020) find, for Europe from 1919 to 2008, that unrest grows with the size of budget cuts; the threshold is a choice | |
unrest_anger_per_point κ | 10 points of anger per point of loss | a loss of 5% beyond the threshold calls for 50 points of anger out of 100 | |
unrest_anger_half_life_days hA | 20 days | a movement hardens in a few weeks | |
unrest_habituation_half_life_days hH | 180 days | Ponticelli and Voth (2020, abstract) link unrest to budget cuts (to a change, not to the level at which it leaves the budget), without measuring how long a movement lasts; the half-life is a choice of the studio, between six months and a year (both are measured below) | |
unrest_riot_anger | 60 points of anger | the riot threshold | |
unrest_end_anger | 5 points of anger | the end threshold, and the least needed to start | |
unrest_riot_output | −0.2% of output in the first year | Hadzi-Vaskov, Pienknagura and Ricci (2021) measure what major episodes of social unrest cost GDP; the value used is a choice, to be compared with their estimates | |
unrest_cooldown_days | 180 days | a group does not take to the streets again in the six months after its movement ends; other groups can; a game design choice | |
unrest_demand_step | 0.5 points of GDP | what a group asks for on top when its line has not been touched |
Announced measures and the government's responses
An announced measure already calls for anger before it is applied, and it stops calling for anger on the very day it is withdrawn or rejected by parliament. The movement then falls back before dying out.
Conceding first withdraws the measure announced against the group. If the line has already moved, conceding then orders what the group demands, like an order from the player. This order goes through the usual vote (E25), and if parliament rejects it, the loss comes back, and the anger with it. The player concedes only once per movement and receives it only once, whereas the firm hand can be used several times, at a cost of 2 points of popularity for the government each time, in the country and in the group. When the same measure was making two groups poorer, conceding to one can also calm the other.
Without a player, over ten games of twenty years, advanced countries see 16 movements per country per century, emerging countries 7.5, and low-income countries almost none. A movement lasts 108 days at the median in advanced countries and 75 in emerging countries, and 5% of them turn into riots. A few countries drive the average, since half of the advanced countries see fewer than 8 per century, and half of the top of the ranking goes to small territories whose population groups are estimated from a neighbour for lack of a source, such as Nauru or Tuvalu. France sees 9 in two hundred years of games. Most often, a movement starts from what the state has taken from a group's income, and the unemployed and retirees alone account for four starts out of five.
Show the full rulesThe announced measures, each response in detail, what a cut played by hand and the world without players give, and what the mechanism leaves out.
The announced measures
A measure of the player does not apply on the day they take it. Once decided, it waits for the first of the following month. Once put to a vote, it waits for the assembly's vote (E25). In between, it is announced. As long as their government has announced a measure that moves a budget line (the amount or share of a spending line, E26; the rate of a tax, E35; the split of a line, E29) and that is not yet in force, the groups of the player's country read their loss Lg each day as if the announced lines already applied. These lines are computed as the first of the month will compute them, with the rest of the economy as it is on that day. The start of a movement is judged each day on this reading. People therefore take to the streets against a measure on the day it is announced, without waiting for it to apply or to be voted on.
A measure that is withdrawn, or rejected by the assembly, stops calling for anger on the same day. The loss becomes that of the first of the month again, and the movement it had launched subsides and then dies out. Once passed, it waits for the first of the following month, still announced, then applies, and the month's reading finds it in force. When several measures are announced on the same line, the last one counts.
Non-player governments announce nothing. Their fiscal rule decides on the same day, and their groups read their incomes on the first of the month.
The government's responses
The player responds to each movement in their country whenever they wish, between two days, by naming the group. A response affects only that group's movement. Each response is an action in the player's log, replayed when a save is loaded. Conceding to one group can make up for the loss of another. Withdrawing a pension cut also calms the low-income households it was making poorer.
- Conceding first withdraws what the government had announced on the demanded line and that is not yet in force. This means any measure that moves it (its amount, its share, the rate of a tax that raises it, its split), whether the decision waiting for the first of the month or the measure in the bill. A bill left with no measure is withdrawn, and a reform keeps its other measures. If the line in force is not already what the movement demands, conceding then orders the demand as an order of the player. A spending line is ordered by its amount. A revenue line, which the player sets only through its taxes (E35), is ordered by the rate of its main tax (the first of the taxes that raise it: income tax, VAT, excise duties, property tax…), the rate that brings the line back to the amount demanded with the other taxes unchanged. That rate is found by halving 64 times the interval between the rate in force and the bound on the requested side. If decided, the measure applies on the first of the following month. If put to a vote, it waits for the assembly's vote (E25), which can reject it. The loss then comes back, and anger with it. Anger at once loses the share
unrest_concession_calm. Once the measure is withdrawn, or the demand announced, the loss the group reads is made up, the anger it calls for falls back, and the movement dies out. Once per movement. It is refused when the line is already what the movement demands and nothing is announced against it. - Receiving them (negotiating) removes
unrest_talks_calmpoints of anger. Once per movement. - A firm hand removes
unrest_force_calmpoints of anger and costsunrest_force_popularitypoints of popularity, in the country and in the group, which then return towards their target at the pace of popularity (E12). Since the loss remains, anger climbs back towards what it still calls for, and the riots come back as long as the group has not got used to the loss enough. - Letting it run changes nothing. The movement subsides as the group gets used to its loss.
Non-player governments use a firm hand each time a riot breaks out. Their movements last as long as the group feels its loss. They last until it gets used to the loss, until the economic situation makes it up, until their fiscal rule gives back what it had taken, or until a new government arrives. Its groups then judge it from the economy it finds (E28), and the loss starts again from zero.
The news items report each turning point of a movement in the player's country. Elsewhere, they report its start, its first riot, the firm hand that answers it and its end.
| Parameter | Value | Status | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
unrest_concession_calm | half of the anger | conceding calms part of it at once; the rest falls back with the loss, once the measure is withdrawn or the demand announced | |
unrest_talks_calm | 15 points of anger | receiving the movement calms it a little, once | |
unrest_force_calm | 40 points of anger | a firm hand calms it a lot, for a time | |
unrest_force_popularity | 2 points of popularity | what it costs the government |
The results
Measured:
- A cut played by hand. France, with its government deciding its budget alone, cuts its pensions by two points of GDP on the first day (without the parties, because the National Assembly rejects the cut with 60% of the seats). The cut applies on 1 February. On that day, the state has taken 15.4% of their income from retirees, 6.1% from low-income households, 2.8% from the middle class and rural dwellers, 1.1% from well-off households, and nothing from young people or the unemployed. The market has taken 0.7% from them, and 0.6% from the unemployed. Retirees and low-income households take to the streets on the day of the announcement, 1 January (day 0), each in its own movement. On 2 February, the retirees' anger stands at 67 out of 100, that of low-income households at 28, and that of the middle class and rural dwellers, who lose barely more than the threshold, at 6. The other groups stay at home. The retirees' protests turn into riots on 27 January (day 26). Over the year that follows the cut, output loses 0.20% compared with the same game without the movements, and it is the riots themselves that cost it. The same game in which a riot costs nothing (
unrest_riot_outputat zero) gives back the whole gap. A country in the streets does not receive the same events, however (E55). In this game, these are mayors asking for a curfew and clashes on the fringes of a march, on top of the bridge that threatens to collapse in both games. The measurement leaves them unanswered, and they weigh nothing on output that year. When the government concedes at the first riot (day 27), before the cut applies, the cut is withdrawn and the movement dies out 53 days later. When it concedes once the cut is in force (day 32), pensions are given back on 1 March and the movement dies out 55 days later. - The same cut, never answered, without an election, so that the same government stays. The retirees' anger stands at 96 after three months, 76 after six and 27 after a year. The riots calm down on day 235, and the movement dies out on day 527, with the cut still in force. With a half-life of one year instead of six months, anger stands at 96, 99 and 66, then 24 after two years. The riots calm down on day 410, and the movement dies out on day 905. Without habituation, anger rises to 100 and stays there, and the riots never end.
- The same cut, tabled in the National Assembly, with the parties. Retirees take to the streets on the day of tabling (day 0), the National Assembly rejects the cut on 31 January (day 30), and the movement, which nothing calls for any more, dies out on 14 April (day 103).
- The world without a player, over ten games of twenty years. There are 16.0 movements per country per century in advanced countries, 7.6 in emerging ones and 0.3 in low-income countries. Of these movements, 5%, 6% and none turn into riots, and 18%, 30% and none start when another group in the country is already in the streets. A movement lasts 108, 77 and 193 days at the median. There are up to seven at once in a single country. What the state had taken (pg) would have been enough on its own, before any habituation, to pass the loss that puts a group in the streets (2.5%) in 61% of the starts in advanced countries and 73% of those in emerging ones. What the market had taken, weighed as the group weighs it, would have been enough in 40% and 27%. The countries that see the most are Venezuela, Nauru, Tuvalu, Macao, Timor-Leste, Brunei, Libya, the Northern Mariana Islands, Saint Martin and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Five of these ten (Nauru, Tuvalu, the Northern Marianas, Saint Martin, Saint Kitts and Nevis) are small territories whose groups are estimated from a neighbour. Saint Martin, which its routes empty (E85), came onto the list with them. France sees 9 in two hundred years of games, the United States 19, Germany 9, Greece 43 and Argentina 48.
- Where they come from, in the same ten games.
- A few countries make the average. Advanced countries see 16.0 per country per century on average, but 8.0 at the median. Nine in ten have fewer than 51.0, the hardest hit has 106.0, seven have none, and the ten that have the most make up 42% of the total. In emerging countries, the median is 0.5 for an average of 7.6. Of 110 countries, 45 have none, and ten make up 72%. Three of the ten leading countries (Venezuela, Macao, Timor-Leste) are among those that the model itself holds out of its domain (a hyperinflation, a sovereign wealth fund that it does not know).
- What was moving on the day of the start. In 4% of the starts in advanced countries and 34% of those in emerging ones, the country was shut out of the markets after a default, which closes its primary deficit at a stroke (E16). Otherwise, what the state had taken was enough on its own in 58% and 46% of starts, although primary spending had fallen by more than 2% in a year in only 16% and 22% of starts. For the rest, either the fall was slower, or it does not go through total spending, and the measurement does not tell them apart. Otherwise again, what the market had taken was enough on its own in 28% and 12%. Two groups account for four starts in five, all countries together: the unemployed (42%) and retirees (40%).
- The same games, with one setting changed, and no other equation. Non-player budgets held still (
fiscal_half_life_daysinfinite): 12.4 per advanced country per century instead of 16.0. What the state had taken is now enough on its own in only 15% of starts instead of 54%, but a country that no longer adjusts its budget defaults, and it is shut out of the markets in 56% of starts instead of 14%. Non-player governments with their rules alone (without E24): 14.7 on average, and the median goes from 8.0 to 5.5. The grievance raised by one point (a loss of 3.5% instead of 2.5%): 7.1 on average, 1.5 at the median; by two and a half points (5%): 2.8, and a median of zero. The control run (budgets held still, rules alone, no default), where a non-player government no longer decides anything: 1,300 movements remain, 5.3 per advanced country per century, none of them where what the state had taken was enough on its own; what the market had taken is enough on its own in 1,298 of them. Nothing else in the model is therefore read as a decision of the state. - Almost none in low-income countries: 14 in all, of which more than three quarters (79%) start when the country is shut out of the markets after a default, 21% because of what the state has taken, and none because of what the market has taken.
What it simplifies
Everything is a choice, except the weight of the market, taken from E28. No study gives, in points of anger, the loss of income that leads people into the streets, nor the cost of a riot for a given country. A movement follows a single group. Several groups in the streets make several movements, with no common front and no shared demand, and a group that loses barely more than the threshold leads a movement as well as a ruined group does. It takes no more anger to start than to last. Habituation is the same for everyone. A retiree gets used to a reduced pension at the pace at which a well-off household gets used to a tax, and to a loss of 15% as to a loss of 3%; its half-life is a choice that nothing measures. It applies only to the streets. The group's opinion (E28) does not get used to the loss, and a group that has gone back home still judges its government on what it has taken from it since it arrived. Habituation runs on the loss in force, not on an announced measure, and on the loss read on the first of the month. Anger feeds only on the loss of income. Neither inflation as such, nor youth unemployment, nor unpopularity, nor contagion from one country to another, nor social networks, nor past repression gives rise to it. The loss is measured from the government's arrival, so a new government wipes out the grievances against the old one. Nothing depends on the regime. In a democracy and in a dictatorship, groups take to the streets at the same thresholds, and a firm hand costs the same popularity there. Riots cost only output, with no deaths, no damage and no risk premium on the debt. Conceding goes through the usual vote, and a parliament can refuse what the street would obtain. Non-player governments never concede and never negotiate. The demand is a single line, fixed when the movement starts, in points of GDP. A group claims what a revenue line takes from it, not a rate, and conceding on a revenue line touches only its main tax, never the other taxes that raise it. An announced measure is judged as if it already applied in full. Neither the chance that it is rejected nor the time it will take to come tempers anger.
Sources
- Ponticelli, J. and Voth, H.-J. (2020), “Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919-2008”, Journal of Comparative Economics 48 (1).
- Hadzi-Vaskov, M., Pienknagura, S. and Ricci, L. A. (2021), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Social Unrest”, IMF Working Paper 21/135.
- Healy, A., Persson, M. and Snowberg, E. (2017), for the weight of the state and the market: see E28.