Epure Works

Model v0.2

Bibliography

Every source of the model, and what was taken from it.

Each value has been checked against its source, unless stated otherwise: “abstract” when only the abstract was read, “cited by” when the figure comes from a secondary source that reproduces it, “working paper” when the published version may differ. Sources consulted on 22 and 23 September 2026.

Model structure and monetary policy

  • Berg, Karam and Laxton (2006), “A Practical Model-Based Approach to Monetary Policy Analysis—Overview”, IMF, Working Paper 06/80. Used: the structure (demand, Phillips, rate rule); β_lag 0.50 to 0.90; β_RR + β_z 0.10 to 0.25; smoothing 0.50 to 1.0; “start simple, then extend”; an independent shock in each equation (E13).
  • Taylor (1993), “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, p. 195-214. Used: 1.5 on inflation, 0.5 on the gap; the neutral rate based on trend growth.
  • Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability”, QJE 115(1), p. 147-180. Used: smoothing of 0.79 per quarter; a rule on expected inflation.
  • Holston, Laubach and Williams (2017), Journal of International Economics 108, current estimates of the New York Fed (2026Q2). Used: neutral rates and trend growth rates of the United States, Canada and the euro area.
  • BIS, policy rate database (WS_CBPOL); ECB, policy rates. Used: observed floors.
  • Enzinger, Gechert, Heimberger, Prante and Romero (2025), preprint (OSF), and SUERF Policy Brief 1287. Used: effects of monetary policy corrected for publication bias.
  • Havranek and Rusnak (2013), International Journal of Central Banking 9(4). Used: transmission lags to prices.
  • Brandão-Marques et al. (2020), IMF, Working Paper 20/35. Used: transmission in emerging countries.
  • Mohanty and Klau (2004), BIS, Working Paper 149 (abstract). Used: central banks in emerging countries respond to the exchange rate.
  • Ball (1994), “What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?”, in Monetary Policy, NBER. Used: the cost of a disinflation.
  • Campbell and Mankiw (1988), “International Evidence on the Persistence of Economic Fluctuations”, NBER WP 2498, table 6 (scanned version; the published version, JME 1989, was not checked). Used: the quarterly autocorrelation of GDP growth in the G7, from 1957 to 1986 (France from 1965), from −0.38 (France) to 0.30 (United States), median 0.07 (E13). Cross-checked: 0.37 for US GNP per capita from 1948 to 1997 (Schmitt-Grohé, FEDS 1998-19, p. 11).
  • Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2008), “What Happens During Recessions, Crunches and Busts?”, IMF WP 08/274, table 1A and p. 12-15 (the published version, Economic Policy 2009, was only read as an abstract). Used: 122 recessions in 21 OECD countries from 1960 to 2007, dated with the Harding and Pagan algorithm; 5.81 per country on average, or 1.2 per decade; 11% of the time in recession; median duration of 3 quarters; median decline of 1.87% (E13).

Prices and the labour market

  • Ball and Mazumder (2019), “A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations and Short-Term Unemployment”, JMCB 51(1), table 4. Used: anchoring 0.773 after 1998; decay 0.875 per quarter; slope 0.236 per point of unemployment.
  • IMF, October 2018 WEO, chapter 3, annex 3.2. Used: anchoring 0.566 and slope 0.159 in emerging countries.
  • Jašová, Moessner and Takáts (2018), BIS, Working Paper 748. Used: Phillips slopes by period and by group.
  • Blanchard (2016), “The Phillips Curve: Back to the '60s?”, AER P&P. Used: how the slope and the anchoring have changed in the United States.
  • Hazell, Herreño, Nakamura and Steinsson (2022), QJE. Used: very low regional slope (0.0062 per quarter, not annualised).
  • Kose et al. (2019), World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 8785; World Bank (2019), Inflation in Emerging and Developing Economies. Used: anchoring by group; weight of global shocks in the inflation of low-income countries.
  • Ball, Furceri, Leigh and Loungani (2019), “Does One Law Fit All?”, Open Economies Review 30(5), figure 1 and table 1. Used: Okun 0.39 and 0.20; the 25 country values.
  • Ball, Leigh and Loungani (2017), “Okun's Law: Fit at 50?”, JMCB 49(7), tables 2 and 7. Used: the US lags, from which the speed of adjustment is derived.
  • An, Bluedorn and Ciminelli (2021), Empirical Economics, table 1. Used: Okun 0.17 for emerging and developing countries; the role of informality.
  • Ball and Onken (2021), NBER Working Paper 29343 (abstract). Used: hysteresis, for §9.
  • Alvarez, Beraja, Gonzalez-Rozada and Neumeyer (2019), “From Hyperinflation to Stable Prices: Argentina's Evidence on Menu Cost Models”, QJE 134(1), tables I and III. Used: a price lasts 4.5 months at zero inflation, a threshold of 14%, and an elasticity of the frequency of 0.53 above it (E4).
  • Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), “The New Keynesian Economics and the Output-Inflation Trade-off”, BPEA 1988(1), tables 5 and 8; Gagnon (2009), QJE 124(3) (working paper IFDP 896); Ascari and Sbordone (2014), JEL 52(3). Used: the slope rises with inflation (E4).
  • Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), NBER Working Paper 13882. Used: the hyperinflation threshold.

Credibility (E17)

  • Chansriniyom, Epstein and Nalban (2020), “The Monetary Policy Credibility Channel and the Amplification Effects in a Semi-structural Model”, IMF, Working Paper 20/201, equations 3 to 6 and table 1. Used: the stock of credibility and its signal; persistence of 0.75 per quarter; credible (0.4) and de-anchored (0.8, towards 10%) regimes.
  • Argov, Epstein, Karam, Laxton and Rose (2007), IMF WP 07/207; Alichi et al. (2009), IMF WP 09/94. Used: the same structure, other calibrations (persistence of 0.7 and 0.18); 1.5 to 2 years and more than 4 years to rebuild credibility.
  • Ball and Mazumder (2014), NBER Working Paper 20715 (the 2019 version is cited above). Used: θ from 0.06 before 1998 to 0.81-0.83 after, a clean break.
  • Carvalho, Eusepi, Moench and Preston (2023), “Anchored Inflation Expectations”, AEJ: Macroeconomics 15(1) (2021 manuscript). Used: anchoring lost in the early 1970s and regained in the late 1990s; the gain of 0.125, the one used for the model's memory.
  • Ari, Mulas-Granados, Mylonas, Ratnovski and Zhao (2023), “One Hundred Inflation Shocks: Seven Stylized Facts”, IMF WP 23/190, table 1. Used: 57.7% of inflation shocks resolved within five years, in 3.2 years on average. High inflations are not included, since their selection excludes them (more than 25% in both previous years).
  • Bruno and Easterly (1998), “Inflation crises and long-run growth”, JME 41(1) (working paper PRWP 1517); Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002), “Modern Hyper- and High Inflations”, JEL 40(3) (and NBER w8930); Sargent (1982), “The Ends of Four Big Inflations”. Used: inflation crises above 40% last 6 years at the median; the 45 episodes above 100% from 1960 to 1996 last 40 months on average (table 3a), and inflation in the twelve months after they end is about 33% a year at the median (calculated from table A1, which only gives the figures episode by episode); they end with a change of regime (§8.2).
  • Dornbusch and Fischer (1993), “Moderate Inflation”, World Bank Economic Review 7(1), p. 1-44, table 6 and p. 11-14 and 39-40. Used: “moderate” inflation, from 15 to 30% for at least three years; 55 episodes since 1950, of which 31 lasted three years and only 6 more than five years (Portugal and Colombia, twelve years); afterwards, inflation stays below 15% in 32 cases out of 48. They end with a strong fiscal contraction, an incomes policy and, in general, an exchange-rate commitment (§8.2).
  • Drechsel (2024), NBER WP 32461. Used: the effect of political pressure on expectations, for the unknown pressure_on_central_bank.
  • Bems, Caselli, Grigoli and Gruss (2021), JIE 132 (IMF working paper 18/280). Used: the determinants of anchoring, for the stabilisation plan, §9.

Budget, debt and interest rates

  • Batini, Eyraud, Forni and Weber (2014), “Fiscal Multipliers: Size, Determinants, and Use in Macroeconomic Projections”, IMF, Technical Notes and Manuals 14/04. Used: the multipliers by group, including those of Mineshima et al. (2014) and Ilzetzki (2011) (cited by); the five-year profile (table 9).
  • Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh (2013), JME 60(2) (abstract and working paper). Used: multipliers by level of development, exchange rate regime and openness.
  • Romer and Romer (2010), AER 100(3); Mertens and Ravn (2013), AER 103(4) (cited by); Jentsch and Lunsford (2019), AER 109(7). Used: the narrative tax multipliers and the dispute over them.
  • Kraay (2012), QJE 127(2). Used: a multiplier of 0.5 in low-income countries (spending financed by the World Bank).
  • Coenen et al. (2012), AEJ: Macro 4(1). Used: multipliers by instrument, share of constrained households.
  • IMF, October 2014 WEO, chapter 3. Used: effects of public investment.
  • IMF, April 2015 Fiscal Monitor, chapter 2. Used: stabilisers ≈ share of spending in GDP.
  • Girouard and André (2005), OECD, ECO WP 434; Mourre, Poissonnier and Lausegger (2019), European Commission, Discussion Paper 098. Used: semi-elasticities of the balance.
  • Belinga, Benedek, de Mooij and Norregaard (2014), IMF WP 14/110; Dudine and Jalles (2018), Journal of International Development 30(6). Used: elasticity of revenue to GDP.
  • Blanchard (1990), “Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators”, OECD, Economics Department Working Paper 79. Used: the primary balance that stabilises the debt.
  • Bohn (1998), “The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Deficits”, QJE 113(3), p. 949-963, tables I and III. Used: the response of the primary balance to debt.
  • Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry and Qureshi (2013), Economic Journal 123(566) (NBER working paper 16782). Used: a response of 0.02 to 0.06, fiscal fatigue; the debt limits of 19 advanced countries and their median (table 3); the default risk premium (equation 7); the triangular distribution of the shock; the 90% recovery rate; the smallest fiscal space (63.4 points, calculated).
  • IMF (2013), “Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustainability Analysis in Market-Access Countries”, table 7; IMF and World Bank (2018), LIC-DSF guidance note, table 7. Used: the risk thresholds, 85, 70 and 55% of GDP.
  • Cruces and Trebesch (2013), “Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts”, AEJ: Macro 5(3) (CESifo working paper 3604), table 1 and p. 18-24. Used: an average haircut of 37%, exclusion for 5.1 years, spreads after restructuring.
  • Borensztein and Panizza (2009), “The Costs of Sovereign Default”, IMF Staff Papers 56(4) (IMF working paper 08/238), tables 2, 10 and 11. Used: −2.6 then −1.2 points of growth; the head of the executive changes in 11 defaults out of 22.
  • Reinhart (2002), NBER WP 8738, table 4. Used: 84% of defaults come with a currency crisis within two years, for the unknown currency_crisis_inflation.
  • Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), “Debt Intolerance”, NBER WP 9908, tables 3 and
  • Used: in middle-income countries, from 1970 to 2001, more than half of the defaults happened at an external debt below 60% of GNP, and only 13% above 100% (§8.2).
  • Norwegian fiscal rule (spend the expected return of the sovereign wealth fund): the argument for a choice in E9, not a value; the source was not checked for this document.
  • Mendoza and Ostry (2008), JME 55(6), p. 1081-1093. Used: the response weakens in emerging countries beyond 50% of debt.
  • Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), NBER WP 10780; Frankel, Végh and Vuletin (2012), NBER WP 17619. Used: the fiscal procyclicality of developing countries.
  • Laubach (2009), JEEA 7(4). Used: 3 to 4 basis points per point of debt, about 25 per point of deficit, in the United States.
  • Baldacci and Kumar (2010), IMF, Working Paper 10/184. Used: 5 basis points per point of debt, 17 per point of deficit.
  • Checherita-Westphal and Domingues Semeano (2020), ECB, Working Paper 2486. Used: pass-through from the market rate to the effective rate.
  • Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of 29 April 2024 (national medium-term fiscal-structural plans). Used: adjustment over four years, extendable by three.
  • OECD (2026), Global Debt Report 2026, chapter 1. Used: maturities, share of short-term securities in emerging countries.
  • World Bank, IDA Terms, in force on 1 January 2026 (IDA21). Used: a regular credit runs for 31 years, including 6 years of grace, and is repaid at 4% a year.
  • Escolano, Shabunina and Woo (2017), Fiscal Studies 38(2) (IMF working paper 11/260). Used: gaps between interest rates and growth by group.
  • De Grauwe and Ji (2013), JIMF 34 (working paper); Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza (2016), IJCB 12(3) (abstract). Used: for monetary union, §9.
  • Cantor and Packer (1996), FRBNY Economic Policy Review 2(2); Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011), IJFE 16(1); Abbas et al. (2011), IMF Economic Review 59(4); IMF and World Bank (2018), guidance note on the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries. Used: for credit ratings and default, §9.
  • Godley and Lavoie (2007), Monetary Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 2. Used: the transaction-flow matrix.
  • ILO (2024), World Social Protection Report 2024-2026: Universal Social Protection for Climate Action and a Just Transition, Geneva, International Labour Office, figure 3.11 and note 29 of chapter 4, under a CC BY 4.0 licence. Used: public social protection spending excluding health, in % of GDP, weighted by GDP: world 12.9; high income 16.2; upper-middle income 8.5; lower-middle income 4.2; low income 0.8 (E14).

Popularity and elections

  • Paldam (2004), “Economic voting: models, polls and outcomes”, Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Used: −0.6 per point of unemployment and of inflation, −0.15 per quarter in power.
  • Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Public Choice 79; Nannestad and Paldam (2002), “The Cost of Ruling”, in Economic Voting, Routledge (working paper). Used: the cost of ruling, 2¼ points per term; the instability of the popularity functions.
  • Berlemann and Enkelmann (2014), European Journal of Political Economy 36. Used: monthly persistence of 0.74.
  • Frey and Schneider (1980), “Popularity Functions: The Case of the US and West Germany”, in Whiteley (ed.), Models of Political Economy, Sage, tables 2 to 9; Frey and Schneider (1978), Economic Journal 88. Used: 0.31 to 1.08 points of popularity per point of growth in real disposable income (E14).
  • Hibbs (2000), “Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections”, Public Choice 104 (Gothenburg working paper). Used: real disposable income, the classic variable of vote functions (4.12 points per point).
  • Abramowitz (2008), “Forecasting the 2008 Presidential Election with the Time-for-Change Model”, PS 41(4), p. 691-695, table 5. Used: the voting equation (E15), with 51.417; 0.109; 0.604; −4.265; standard error 1.78.
  • Fair (2022), “Presidential and Congressional Vote-Share Equations: November 2022 Update”, table 2; Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville (2015), Electoral Studies 39(3) (accepted manuscript); Nannestad and Paldam (1999), “The Cost of Ruling” (working paper), table 2. Used: the standard deviation of the vote, from 1.78 to 4.5.
  • Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013), Public Choice 157 (abstract); Kayser and Peress (2012), APSR 106(3); Kernell (1978), APSR 72(2); Brender and Drazen (2008), AER 98(5). Used: for full popularity, §9.

Parties, electoral systems and governments (E19 to E24)

The full references, with the pages and tables read, are gathered further down this page.

  • Norris (2020), Global Party Survey 2019, Harvard Dataverse, doi:10.7910/DVN/WMGTNS, CC0, and its codebook. Used: the positions of 1,043 parties on twelve questions; the “strongly populist” category (V8) and the “conservative” cut-off (V6) of its typology.
  • Klüver and Spoon (2020), Journal of Politics 82(4), and their replication data (CC0). Used: junior partners lose 2.2 times more, relatively (derived).
  • Gunderson and Marks (2026), SSRN working paper. Used: the order of magnitude of the half-distance (choice).
  • Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2016), European Economic Review 88, table 5. Used: the far right +32.8% in five years after a financial crisis, the effect gone within ten.
  • King and Browning (1987), APSR 81(4); Gelman and King (1994), AJPS 38(2); Taagepera (1973, 1986). Used: the exponent of the power law, 2.5.
  • Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2011), AJPS. Used: the largest party gets the post of Prime Minister in 72.8% (West) and 77.5% (East) of cases.
  • Roessler and Howard (2009), in Lindberg (ed.), Democratization by Elections. Used: the opposition wins 6% to 34% of the elections held by autocracies.
  • de Haan, Ohnsorge and Yu (2025), Electoral Studies 95; Ebeke and Ölçer (2013), IMF WP 13/153; Brender and Drazen (2005), JME 52(7). Used: the electoral budget cycle.
  • Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), NBER WP 14191; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004). Used: the procyclicality of budgets.
  • Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023), AER 113(12); Bolhuis, Mano and Thorell (2026), IMF WP/26/40; Binder (2021), JMCB 53(4). Used: the growth lost under a populist leader, the pressure on the central bank.
  • Potrafke (2017), Journal of Comparative Economics 45(4); Müller, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2016), JEEA 14(1); Roubini and Sachs (1989), EER 33(5); Elgie and McMenamin (2008). Set aside: a budget that would follow the left-right orientation, coalitions that would consolidate more slowly.

Trade (for §9)

  • Head and Mayer (2014), “Gravity Equations: Workhorse, Toolkit, and Cookbook”, Handbook of International Economics 4 (CEPII working paper 2013-27), tables 4 and 5.
  • Senhadji (1998), IMF Staff Papers 45(2); Simonovska and Waugh (2014), JIE 92(1); Arora and Vamvakidis (2005), IMF Staff Papers 52(1); Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), AER 93(1); Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), REStat 88(4); Baier and Bergstrand (2007), JIE 71(1).

Data

  • World Bank, World Development Indicators, CC BY 4.0: calibration, observed bounds.
  • IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 2026) and Fiscal Monitor (April 2026): calibration, starting inflation (December on December) and bounds, local cache only (licence, §6).
  • BIS, central bank policy rates (WS_CBPOL), December 2024: the starting rates, to be cited as the source.
  • ILO, modelled unemployment estimates (via the World Bank).
  • Wikidata, CC0: the calendar of national elections (E15).

Parties, governments and votes, the full references

The sources of equations E19 to E25, with the pages and tables read.

  • Constitution of the French Republic, article 47: Parliament decides on the budget bill within seventy days.
  • Busemeyer, Rathgeb and Sahm (2022), “Authoritarian values and the welfare state: the social policy preferences of radical right voters”, West European Politics 45(1), p. 77-101, figure 2 and table A12.
  • Carey (2007), “Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting”, American Journal of Political Science 51(1), p. 92-107.
  • Downs (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Row.
  • Hix and Noury (2016), “Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures”, Political Science Research and Methods 4(2), p. 249-273.
  • Poole and Rosenthal (1985), “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis”, American Journal of Political Science 29(2), p. 357-384.
  • Enelow and Hinich (1984), The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction, Cambridge University Press.
  • Binder (2021), “Political pressure on central banks”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 53(4), p. 715-744.
  • Bolhuis, Mano and Thorell (2026), “Central bank governor turnover and monetary policy”, IMF WP/26/40, table 6, column 1 (working paper).
  • Brender and Drazen (2005), “Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies”, Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7), p. 1271-1295, tables 1 and 4.
  • Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1993), European Journal of Political Economy 9, p. 1-23, cited by Potrafke (2017), p. 33 (original not read).
  • Cazals and Mandon (2016), “Political budget cycles: manipulation from leaders or manipulation from researchers? Evidence from a meta-regression analysis”, CERDI, Études et documents no. 9.
  • de Haan, Ohnsorge and Yu (2025), “Political budget cycles in emerging and developing economies”, Electoral Studies 95 (CEPR DP 18708), tables 2 and 4.
  • Ebeke and Ölçer (2013), “Fiscal policy over the election cycle in low-income countries”, IMF WP 13/153, table 1.
  • Elgie and McMenamin (2008), “Political fragmentation, fiscal deficits and political institutionalisation”, Dublin City University working paper.
  • Frankel, Végh and Vuletin (2013), “On graduation from fiscal procyclicality”, Journal of Development Economics 100(1); version read: NBER WP 17619.
  • Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2011), “Who "wins"? Determining the party of the prime minister”, American Journal of Political Science (online version read).
  • Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2016), “Going to extremes: politics after financial crises, 1870–2014”, European Economic Review 88, p. 227-260, table 5 and p. 29-30.
  • Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023), “Populist leaders and the economy”, American Economic Review 113(12), p. 3249-3288, table 2 and figure 6.
  • Gootjes, de Haan and Jong-A-Pin (2019), “Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?”, De Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper no. 634.
  • Gunderson and Marks (2026), gravity model of vote transfers, SSRN working paper of 27 May 2026 (not peer-reviewed), p. 36.
  • Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), “Procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries: truth or fiction?”, NBER WP 14191, table 1.
  • Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), “When it rains, it pours”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 19, table 10.
  • King and Browning (1987), American Political Science Review 81(4); Gelman and King (1994), American Journal of Political Science 38(2); Taagepera (1973, 1986).
  • Klüver and Spoon (2020), “Helping or hurting? How governing as a junior coalition partner influences electoral outcomes”, Journal of Politics 82(4), p. 1231-1242; replication data, doi:10.7910/DVN/KVIJSY (CC0).
  • Norris (2020), Global Party Survey 2019, Harvard Dataverse, doi:10.7910/DVN/WMGTNS (CC0 1.0), and its codebook.
  • Müller, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2016), “The political color of fiscal responsibility”, Journal of the European Economic Association 14(1), p. 252-302.
  • Potrafke (2017), “Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies”, Journal of Comparative Economics 45(4); version read: CESifo WP 6024, 2016.
  • Roessler and Howard (2009), “Post-Cold War political regimes: when do elections matter?”, in Lindberg (ed.), Democratization by Elections, Johns Hopkins University Press.
  • Roubini and Sachs (1989), “Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies”, European Economic Review 33(5); version read: NBER WP 2682.

Population, incomes and opinion, the full references

The sources of equations E27 to E29.

  • Deming and Stephan (1940), “On a least squares adjustment of a sampled frequency table when the expected marginal totals are known”, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 11(4), p. 427-444.
  • Healy, Persson and Snowberg (2017), “Digging into the Pocketbook: Evidence on Economic Voting from Income Registry Data Matched to a Voter Survey”, American Political Science Review 111(4), p. 771-785, tables 1 and 5.
  • Upward and Wright (2024), Journal of Public Economics 239, 105253, table 1: job loss and support for the party in power, British BHPS and UKHLS panels, 1991-2017.
  • Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001), “Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence from Surveys of Happiness”, American Economic Review 91(1), p. 335-341.
  • Kinder and Kiewiet (1979), “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior”, American Journal of Political Science 23(3), p. 495-527.
  • Bansak, Bechtel and Margalit (2021), American Political Science Review 115(2): choice experiments on austerity packages in Italy and Spain.
  • Kostelka, Singh and Blais (2022), Political Science Research and Methods: compulsory voting, enforced or not, and turnout in democratic elections from 1945 to 2017; replication data under CC0, doi:10.7910/DVN/7OB0YJ.
  • Persson, Solevid and Öhrvall (2013): the Swedish regional council election rerun in 2011, and the gaps in turnout when it falls.
  • Dassonneville, Hooghe and Miller (2016), paper presented at the APSA annual meeting: education, political knowledge and turnout under compulsory voting.
  • Hübscher, Sattler and Wagner (2023), British Journal of Political Science: fiscal consolidations, abstention and the vote for non-mainstream parties, 166 elections.
  • Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012), “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review”, Journal of Economic Literature 50(1), p. 3-50.
  • OECD and KIPF (2014), The Distributional Effects of Consumption Taxes in OECD Countries, OECD Tax Policy Studies no. 22: VAT and excise duties as a share of the income of each decile.
  • DREES (2022), Le non-recours au minimum vieillesse des personnes seules, Les Dossiers de la DREES, May 2022.
  • The sources of the data: population.md, revenus-et-avis.md.

Campaign, the full references

The sources of equations E30 to E32.

  • Erikson, R. S. and Wlezien, C. (2012). The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter. University of Chicago Press.
  • Holbrook, T. M. (1996). Do Campaigns Matter? Sage Publications.
  • Thomson, R., Royed, T., Naurin, E., Artés, J., Costello, R., Ennser-Jedenastik, L., Ferguson, M., Kostadinova, P., Moury, C., Pétry, F. and Praprotnik, K. (2017). “The Fulfillment of Parties' Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing”. American Journal of Political Science, 61(3), p. 527-542.
  • Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), p. 297-323.
  • Constitution of 4 October 1958, article 7.

Protest movements, the full references

The sources of equation E33.

  • Ponticelli, J. and Voth, H.-J. (2020), “Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919-2008”, Journal of Comparative Economics 48 (1).
  • Hadzi-Vaskov, M., Pienknagura, S. and Ricci, L. A. (2021), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Social Unrest”, IMF Working Paper 21/135.
  • Healy, A., Persson, M. and Snowberg, E. (2017), for the weight of the state and the market: see E28.